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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS PERFORMANCE,
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE,
AND QWL PROGRAMS: AN INTERPLANT ANALYSIS
HARRY C. KATZ, THOMAS A. KOCHAN, and
KENNETH R. GOBEILLE*
This study analyzes the relationship among plant-level measures of
industrial relations performance, economic performance, and quality-of-
working-life programs. The analysis employs pooled time-series and cross-
section data from 18 plants within a division of General Motors for the years
1970-79. The empirical results show strong associations between industrial
relations and economic performance mecisures and limited support for the
hypothesis that quality-of-working-life efforts improve both kinds of
performance.
I N RECENT years, industrial relationsscholars have lamented the field's preoc-
cupation with comparisons of union and
nonunion settings and have stressed the
need to examine the diversity of experience
in different unionized settings.' At the same
time, scholars have also recommended that
more bargaining research be based on
micro-level data. Both of these recommen-
•Harry Katz and Thomas Koehan are, respectively,
Associate Professor and Professor of Industrial Rela-
tions at the Sloan School of Management, Massachu-
setts Institute of lechnology, and Kenneth Gobeille is a
Supervisor of Salaried Personnel of the General Motors
Corporation. The authors wish to thank Anil Verma for
his excellent assistance in data analysis. They also
thank the staff of the General Motors Corporation for
their assistance in collecting these data and for their
comments on the paper. Partial support for this
research was provided by the Sloan Foundation.
'This point is stressed in Thomas A. Koehan, Labor
Management Relations Research Priorities for the
1980s (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Labor,
1980), pp. 20-22. See also John T. Dunlop, "Policy
Decisions and Research in Economics and Industrial
dations have been made in recognition of
the need to assess the performance of
industrial relations systems at the work-
place and the results of change strategies
designed to improve that performance.^
While these ideas have been evolving
within the research community, a number
of companies and unions have been experi-
menting with new strategies for improving
the performance of their bargaining rela-
tionships at the plant level through what
Relations," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
Vol. 30, No. 3 (April 1977), pp. 275-82. For a call for
similar research from a practitioner's viewpoint, see
Audrey Freedman, "A User's Agenda for Labor
Management Relations Research," in Barbara D.
Dennis, ed.. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual
Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research
Association, 1981), pp. 22-25.
^For a more complete discussion of these arguments
and of the concept of "performance" or "effectiveness"
in collective bargaining, see Thomas A. Koehan,
Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations: From
Theory to Policy and Practice (Homewood, 111.: Irwin,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1983). © 1983 by Cornell University.
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generally have been labeled "quality of
working life" (QWL) programs.' The com-
mon thread running through these efforts is
their attempt to establish practical rela-
tionships outside such traditional union-
management activities as arms-length
negotiations, formal and informal
grievance handling, and union-man-
agement committees. Instead, QWL pro-
grams represent an attempt to establish
direct channels of communication between
workers and their supervisors and involve
workers in shop-floor decision making. It is
through this process that the participants
hope to improve both organizational effec-
tiveness and the psychological rewards
workers obtain from their jobs.^
These QWL programs hold the potential
for significantly altering the conduct of
labor relations in the United States. In-
deed, the popular press and media have
given a tremendous amount of attention to
these efforts. They are often seen as part of
the solution to sluggjish productivity
growth, as a way of easing the traditional
1980), pp. 25-32; Milton Derber, W.E. Chalmers, and
Milton Edelman, "Assessing Union Management Rela-
tions," Quarterly Review of Economics and Business,
Vol. 1, No. 4 (November 1961), pp. 27-40; and Jeanne
M. Brett, "Behavioral Research on Unions and Union
Management Systems," in Barry Staw and L.L.
Cummings, eds., Research in Organizational Behavior,
Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1980), pp.
188-93.
'See, for example, Robert H. Guest, "Quality of
Work Life — Learning from Tarrytown," Harvard Busi-
ness Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (July-August 1979), pp. 76-
87; Stephen H. Fuller, "How Quality of Worklife
Projects Work for General Motors" Monthly Labor
Review, Vol. 103, No. 7 (July 1980), pp. 37-38; and
Irving Bluestone, "How Quality of Worklife Projects
Work for the United Auto Workers," Monthly Labor
Review, Vol. 103, No. 7 (July 1980), pp. 39-40.
"For a summary of the theoretical assumptions
underlying QWL and other forms of worker partici-
pation, as well as a comprehensive review of the
empirical literature on these subjects, see Jeanne Brett
and Tove Hammer, "Organizational Behavior and
Industrial Relations," in Thomas A. Koehan, Daniel
J.B. Mitchell, and Lee Dyer, eds.. Industrial Relations
Research in the 1970s: Review and Appraisal (Madison,
Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1982),
pp. 221-42. For the most comprehensive empirical
evaluation of a QWL effort see Paul S. Goodman,
Assessing Organizational Change: The Rushton Qual-
ity of Work Experiment (New York: Wiley-
Interscience, 1979). See especially pp.7-8 for a
discussion of the joint objectives of QWL efforts.
adversary relationships between labor and
management, and as signifying a "New
Industrial Relations."^ As yet, however, we
have primarily anecdotes, speeches, and
case studies extolling the virtues of these
strategies, rather than hard empirical
evidence on their lasting effects. Analysis of
the impact of these QWL programs re-
quires that researchers control for the
effects of other possible influences—in fact,
that researchers conduct the very sort of
microanalysis that industrial relations re-
searchers have been recommending.**
No well-developed theory or set of
propositions exists, however, that relates
variations in plant-level industrial relations
outcomes obtained under collective bar-
gaining to productivity or any other
measures of organizational effectiveness.
We do have hypotheses regarding the shock
effects of collective bargaining on manage-
ment policy and behavior,' the voice effects
of unions,* and the human resource and
technological adjustments employers make
to changes in bargaining agreements.'
These hypotheses, however, generally ad-
'"The New Industrial Relations," Business Week,
May 11, 1981, pp. 85-98.
'A similar argument for more systematic evaluation
and less reliance on qualitative case studies is made by
Brett and Hammer, "Organizational Behavior," p. 23,
on the basis of their review of both U.S. and European
styles of worker participation. They conclude, "We
have learned more about the effects of... participation
from the few carefully designed studies than from the
numerous case reports available. It is high time
participation researchers move beyond evaluation by
storytelling."
'The shock-effect hypothesis is usually traced to the
work of Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and
Industrial Management (Washington, D.C: The
Brookings Institution, 1941), p. 579. For a later
elaboration of the hypothesis, see Sumner H. Slichter,
James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livemash, The Impact
of Collective Bargaining on Management
(Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1960),
pp. 9-26.
Tor a discussion of the voice effect as well as other
ways in which unions affect workers and employers, see
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, "The
Impact of Collective Bargaining: Illusion or Reality?"
in Jack Stieber, Robert B. McKersie, and D. Quinn
Mills, eds., U.S. Industrial Relations 1950-1980: A
Critical Assessment (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Rela-
tions Research Association, 1981), pp.47-98.
'Management adjustment processes are discussed in
Koehan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Rela-
tions, pp. 331-35.
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dress the average effect of unions and
collective bargaining rather than the effect
of variations in features of the industrial
relations system. None of these hypotheses,
furthermore, helps explain how QWL
efforts can be expected to affect the
industrial relations system or organiza-
tional effectiveness. Thus, for both
theoretical and applied reasons, industrial
relations researchers need to address the
rationale underlying QWL strategies and
their results.
This paper serves as an exploratory effort
to address these questions by examining the
relationship among multiple indicators of
industrial relations performance, the
economic dimensions of organizational
effectiveness, and QWL efforts at the plant
level. It is exploratory in the sense that it
draws on a rich body of plant-level data
seldom available to researchers to test the
strengths of the associations between
measures of industrial relations perfor-
mance and economic performance. Our
purpose is to generate propositions rather
than to test them formally, since an
adequate theoretical structure for relating
these concepts has yet to be developed.
Nevertheless, the data do allow us to test a
number of generally accepted, yet hereto-
fore untested, propositions regarding the
interrelationships among different dimen-
sions of industrial relations performance.
Finally, since the data are drawn from
the files of 18 General Motors (GM) plants
for the years 1970-79, we can begin to
assess the effects of the well-publicized
QWL efforts that began in this corporation
during these years. We do not present our
findings as a formal evaluation of the QWL
efforts, since only limited data are available
from only a subset of the plants. A
comprehensive evaluation would require
data on a broader array of process and
outcome measures and data from a wider
sample of plants. The data do provide an
ideal opportunity to examine empirically
the diversity of results that can be obtained
by the same company and union operating
under the same basic technology in dif-
ferent plants and to examine the potential
the parties have to alter these results.
The General Model
Collective bargaining researchers have
traditionally focused on the formal proce-
dures of contract negotiation and adminis-
tration and on the rules that govern
employment relationships. Our interest
here is in extending this work by relating
variations in the effects of negotiation and
administrative procedures to variations in
plant-level economic performance.
We argue that contract negotiation and
administration procedures will interact
with and influence the attitudes and
behaviors of the workers and mangers who
together establish the attitudinal climate of
the workplace.'" We further expect that
variations in the outcomes or perf^ormance
of industrial relations processes and proce-
dures influence plant-level economic per-
formance through their effects on labor
costs, productivity, and product quality.
QWL efforts are viewed in this analysis as
strategies for involving workers in ways that
are designed to change attitudes and
behaviors and thereby improve both indus-
trial relations performance and economic
performance." These general conceptual
arguments are used to guide the explora-
tory analyses that follow.
Four interrelated dimensions of plant-
'°For a basic theoretical discussion of the relationship
between the attitudinal climate and other aspects of a
collective bargaining relationship, see Richard E.
Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory
of Labor Negotiatio7u(NeviYoiV.: McGraw-Hill, 1965),
pp. 184-280.
"Obviously, other, more complicated causal rela-
tionships could be proposed for relating the broad
concepts of industrial relations performance, economic
performance, or organizational effectiveness to QWL
intervention efforts. One could argue, for example,
that there are feedback or reciprocal relationships
between industrial relations and economic perfor-
mance. While we acknowledge that these more
complex relationships may exist, we are suggesting here
that the predominant causal direction is from indus-
trial relations to economic performance. This view is
consistent both with the conventional literature, cited
above, on the effects of collective bargaining and with
the efforts of management, union, and neutral
practitioners who are attempting to change the
workplace through QWL interventions. Thus, for both
theoretical and practical reasons, this is the model of
central interest to industrial relations professionals and
therefore the approach taken in our analysis.
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level industrial relations performance are
analyzed in this study. These dimensions
and their associated measures are: (1) the
attitudinal climate of the union-
management relationship, measured by an
attitude survey; (2) the results of the
contract administration process, measured
by both grievance and discipline rates; (3)
the intensity of contract negotiations,
measured by the number of demands
introduced in local contract negotiations
and the length of time taken to reach local
agreements; and (4) individual worker
behavior, measured by the rate of absentee-
ism in the plant. Although these measures
are not posed as exhaustive indicators of
industrial relations performance at the
plant level, they do focus on four of the
most important dimensions of the collective
bargaining relationship.
In this analysis, these industrial rela-
tions performance measures are viewed as
systematically interrelated in a complex
cycle that is perpetuated over time such
that a simple cause-effect relationship may
be impossible to discern. Indeed, there may
be little practical value in attempting to
specify the precise direction of the casual
relationships among these performance
measures, since over successive rounds of
bargaining, conflicts from one aspect of the
relationship are likely to carry over to the
others and thereby blur the origin of the
casual chain. For example, unresolved
grievances are likely to turn into contract
proposals and thereby produce more hostile
attitudinal relationships, perhaps also
leading to higher levels of absenteeism. Or
the cycle could just as easily begin with a
particularly difficult round of negotiations,
which later affects the grievance proce-
dure, union-management attitudes, and
employee behavior. The critical question,
therefore, is whether QWL progp"ams (or
some other intervention) can break into this
causal chain, produce improvements in one
or more of these dimensions, and thereby
alter the performance of the others. An
ancillary question is whether these QWL
efforts either directly or through improve-
ments in industrial relations performance
lead to improvements in the quality of
workers' jobs and improved economic
performance for the firm.
Data and Analysis Plan
The data for this study were collected
from company files on 18 plants in which
joint efforts with the United Automobile
Workers were under way during the years
1970-79. The plants are all in one GM
division in which the technology and
product are very similar. Four of the plants,
however, did not report data for 1970. The
overall data set thus provides a pooled
cross-section sample of 176 observations for
most of the industrial relations and
economic performance measures. Missing
data on a small number of variables
reduces this sample in some of the analyses.
Only four rounds of bargaining occurred
during this period (1970, 1973, 1976, and
1979), and some of the plants did not report
bargaining data for the 1970 and 1973
rounds. The maximum sample size for data
on the negotiaton process is thus 68. It
should be noted that this local bargaining
was supplemental to national contract
negotiations.
GM began administering a QWL atti-
tude survey in its plants in 1976. Although
the time of administration in each plant
varied and therefore did not. correspond
precisely to the calendar year from which
the other data derive, there were 65 such
surveys administered between 1976 and
1979. The survey provides a composite
score of responses by nianagers and supervi-
sors to five questions concerning the degree
of trust and cooperation between the union
and management in a plant. That score is
summarized in a variable we label Climate.
Starting in 1977, each plant reported
annually to division headquarters on the
QWL efforts under way in the plant. The
measure used here of the intensity of the
QWL effort is derived from a content
analysis of these reports and therefore is
only available for the years 1977 - 79. The
procedures used in this content analysis are
described in the appendix. Although some
of the plants may have started their QWL
programs before 1977, we have no way of
measuring this; the intensity measure
therefore contains some degree of measure-
ment error.
We measure the economic performance
of each plant with two indices computed by
QWL PROGRAMS
General Motors. A quality index is derived
from a count of the number of faults and
"demerits" that appear in inspections of the
product; this index is available for 1973 to
1979. An efficiency index for direct labor,
available for 1970 through 1979, compares
the actual hours of labor input by produc-
tion workers to standardized hours calcula-
ted by GM's industrial engineers. The
higher the efficiency index, the higher is
efficiency and the lower are costs. The
criteria for labor standards employed in
this index include consideration of varia-
tions in product attributes. Both the
quality and direct-labor indices are annual
plant averages.
We will treat these data as a pooled cross-
sectional sample that measures only some
of the relevant theoretical determinants of
industrial relations performance and
economic performance. Of all the environ-
mental and organizational variables that
could be measured, only those that could
be measured by the data available from
company files and reports could be em-
ployed here. These data are exceedingly
rich, but they do not incorporate all of the
potentially important sources of variations
in the dependent variables, such as
turnover of top plant management or
union leadership, internal union and
management political characteristics, or
differences in the technology and skill mix
in the plant.
To the extent that these unmeasured
factors are randomly distributed across
these plants, they will not bias the coeffi-
cients obtained in our analysis; however, to
the extent that they are correlated with a
measured variable, they will bias the
coefficients.'^ Thus, in some of the analy-
ses, we introduce dummy variables to
capture the unique, plant-specific un-
measured variables that may otherwise bias
our results —a technique that is equivalent
to estimating a fixed-effects model.
The analysis starts with a description of
'^ See, for example, Richard J. Butler and Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, "Estimating the Narcotic Effect of Public
Sector Impasse Procedures," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, Vol. 35, No. 1 (October 1981),
pp. 3-20.
the overall patterns and variations in
industrial relations and economic out-
comes across these plants. We then review
the intercorrelations between the industrial
relations performance measures and test
the correlations among economic perfor-
mance, industrial relations, and environ-
mental factors. Finally, we assess the effects
of the QWL efforts.
Results
At the outset, we noted the importance
of examining the diversity of outcomes that
are produced by collective bargaining in
different bargaining relationships. The
statistics in Table 1 illustrate this point.
Despite the common technology, union,
and employer from which these data are
drawn, there is a wide variation across
plants in grievance rates, discipline rates,
absenteeism, and the other industrial rela-
tions and economic performance measures.
Note that in 1979, for example, grievances
per 100 workers varied from a low of 24 in
one plant to a high of 450 in another plant.
Absenteeism varied between 4.7 and 10.3
percent. The number of contract demands
introduced in the local negotiations for the
1979 agreement varied from a low of 102 to
a high of 754. The economic significance of
the variation in the indices of economic
performance is not as easily interpreted,
since these indices are a product of GM's
particular accounting and quality-control
systems. Nonetheless, these figures do show
considerable variation around their means
and again illustrate the need to investigate
conditions vdthin the plants to determine
the causes of these variations and the effects
of labor-management relations.
Time plots of the data reveal that an
important source of variation appears to be
the business cycle and thus the volume of
work in the plants." There were sharp
increases in grievance activity and absen-
teeism and declines in direct-labor effi-
ciency during the growth years of 1970 - 73,
followed by opposite movements in these
variables as the oil embargo and the
"These plots are available from the authors upon
request.
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Table I. Measures of Industrial Relations and
Economic Performance in 18 Plants, 1979.
Grievances
Absenteeism
Discipline
Contract Demands
Negotiation Time
Climate
Product Quality
Direct-Labor Efficiency
Mean
124.3
7.4
44.5
364.6
76.8
2.9
127.6
87.4
Minimum
24.5
4.7
20.0
4.0
-110.0
2.2
122.0
57.1
Maximum
450.2
10.3
86.8
1163.0
532.0
3.8
137.0
103.7
Standard Deviation
133.1
1.7
17.5
196.4
143.4
.5
3.7
13.2
Legend,
Grievances: the number of grievances filed per 100 workers.
A bsenteeism: the absentee rate as a percentage of straight-time hours, excluding contractual days off.
Discipline: the number of oral warnings, disciplinary leaves, and discharges assessed per 100 workers.
Contract Demands: the number of contract demands submitted by the local union in tri-annual local contract
negotiations.
Negotiation Time: the number of days taken to reach settlement in local contract negotiations before
(negative) or after (positive) settlement of the master agreement between GM and the UAW international.
Climate: an average score (based on a one to five response format) on five survey questions measuring the state
of labor-management relations in the plant. The survey was administered to all managerial and supervisory
employees in the plant. The higher the average score, the more cooperative the relations.
Product Quality: an index derived from a count of the number of faults and demerits that appear in inspections
of the product adjusted for differences in product attributes.
Direct-Labor Efficiency: an index comparing the actual hours of direct labor input to standardized hours
adjusted for differences in product attributes.
consequent decline in auto sales took effect
between 1973 and 1975. As the industry
recovered during the years 1976-79,
grievance activity and absenteeism again
rose and direct-labor efficiency fell substan-
tially. The implication of these variations
for our subsequent analyses is that we do
need to control for both the effects of
variations in the volume of production
activity in the plants and plant-specific
effects that are not captured by the general
environmental measures available to us.
Industrial Relations
Performance Measures
The correlations among the measures of
industrial relations performance are pre-
sented in Table 2. The relationships are all
in the expected direction, and twelve out of
fifteen are statistically significant beyond
the one percent level. These data thus
provide strong support for the proposition
that these industrial relations performance
measures are systematically related in a
reinforcing cycle. In particular, the more
cooperative the attitudinal climate between
the local union and management, the
lower the grievance rate (r = —.77),
discipline rate (r = — .20), and absenteeism
(r = — .49); the fewer the demands
introduced by the union in contract nego-
tiations (r = — .49); and the less the
negotiating time required to reach an
agreement (r = —.52).
Similarly, grievance, discipline, and ab-
senteeism rates are all positively and
significantly correlated with one another
and positively correlated with the number
of contract demands and the length of
negotiation time required to reach a local
agreement. Others have argued that these
interrelationships should exist," but to our
knowledge, this is the first empirical
"Kochan, Collective Bargaining and Industrial
Relations, pp. 390-95; David Peach and E. Robert
Livemash, Grievance Initiation and Resolution: A
Study in Basic Steel (Boston: Graduate School of
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Table 2. Interrelationships Amiong Industrial Relations Performance Variables
as Measured by Simple Correlation Coefficients.^
Climate
Grievances
Discipline
Absenteeism
Contract Demands
Negotiation Time
Climate
1.00
- .77**
- . 2 0
-.49**
-.49**
-.52**
Grievances
1.00
.44**
.26**
.81**
.57**
Discipline
1.00
.43**
.31**
.30**
A bsenteeism
1.00
.31**
.16
Contract
Demands
1.00
.17
Negotiation
Time
1.00
The number of observations ranges between 171 and 176 for correlations involving measures of absenteeism,
grievances, and discipline. The number of observations ranges between 65 and 68 for correlations involving climate,
contract demands, and negotiation time. All variables are as defined in Table 1.
*Statistically significant at .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at .01 level in a two-tailed test.
confinnation provided for this general
proposition.
Industrial Relations Performance,
Environmental Factors,
and Economic Performance
Correlations between measures of
economic performance (indices of product
quality and direct-labor efficiency) and the
industrial relations performance and en-
vironmental measures are presented in
Table 3. Eleven of the twelve correlations
between the economic and industrial rela-
tions performance measures are in the
expected direction. Ten of the twelve are
statistically significant at the 5 percent
level, and nine out of the twelve are
statistically significant at the one percent
level. Higher grievance and discipline rates
are related to lower quality and lower labor
efficiency. Higher absenteeism is related to
lower efficiency. Surprisingly, higher absen-
teeism is also related to higher quality,
although the correlation with quality does
not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance.'^ Fewer difficulties in nego-
Business, Harvard University, 1974); Andrew J.W.
Thomson and Victor V. Murray, Grievance Procedures
(London: Saxon House. 1976); and Thomas R. Knight,
Factors Affecting the Arbitration Submission Rate: A
Comparative Case Study, M.S. thesis (Ithaca, N.Y.:
New York State School of Industrial and Labor
Relations, Cornell University, 1978).
"The data show a rise in both quality and
absenteeism in the late 1970s, which may confound
tiating new contracts (fewer demands and
fewer days required) are related to higher
quality and lower costs. There is also
evidence that economic performance is
related to the volume of economic activity
in the plant, as measured by total work
hours and the overtime ratio.
These correlations support our theoreti-
cal argument that industrial relations
performance affects economic perfor-
mance. The existence of these effects also
provides support for the parties' decision to
embark on a strategy to improve industrial
relations performance in these plants.
Evidence of the association between attitu-
dinal climate and economic performance
provides particularly strong justification
for the QWL programs, since QWL
advocates argue that these attitudes are one
of the key initial targets of QWL efforts. We
shall now turn to the analysis of the impact
of the QWL efforts in these plants.
Analysis of the Impact of QWL
Our underlying model hypothesizes that
QWL efforts affect economic perfor-
mance, industrial relations performance,
and workers' perceptions of the quality of
their jobs. Before proceeding to a review of
our findings, it is important to note tbat our
evaluations of the connection between the two vari-
ables. Correlations of data from plants within a given
year consistently reveal an association between high
product quality and low absentee rates.
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Table 3. Correlations of Economic Performance with Industrial Relations Performance
and Environmental Characteristics.^
Product Quality Direct-Labor Efficiency
Grievances
Discipline
Absenteeism
Climate
Contract Demands
Negotiation Time
Total Hours
Overtime Ratio
- .27**
-.20*
.13
.44**
-.20
-.39**
-.05
.05
-.49**
-.35**
-.38**
.44**
-.32**
-.40**
-.24**
-.29**
The number of observations ranges between 65 and 68 for correlations involving climate, contract demands, and
negotiation time. For all other variables, the number of observations ranges between 126 and 176. Total hours is the
total annual work hours of all production workers, and overtime ratio is the annual number of overtime hours
divided by the number of straight-time hours worked by all production workers. All other variables are as defined in
Table 1.
*StatisticaIly significant at .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at .01 level in a two-tailed test.
data unfortunately provide no measure of
job quality; thus, the possibly important
impact of QWL efforts on job quality
cannot be addressed in this analysis.
Changes in high and low QWL plants. To
assess the impact of the QWL efforts, we
first compare, in Table 4, changes in the
industrial relations and economic perfor-
mance of the five plants with the highest
QWL program ratings (or intensity) in
1977 with changes in the performance of
the five plants with the lowest QWL
program ratings in 1977. We look at
changes before and after 1977 because
discussion with QWL staff in these plants
led us to believe that although the QWL
effort was formally announced in 1973, it
was not until 1977 that QWL programs
were actually in progress in most of the
plants. Also recall that measurement of
QWL programs did not begin until 1977.
From 1974 to 1976, except for direct-
labor efficiency, industrial relations and
economic performance of the plants that
later developed high QWL program ratings
declined relative to the performance
measures of the five plants that later
developed low QWL program ratings. For
instance, in the plants with high QWL
program ratings, grievance and absentee
rates rose 17.6 and 47.5 percent on average
from 1974 to 1976, whereas in the plants
with low QWL program ratings, grievance
and absentee rates rose 4.3 and 23.4
percent.
In contrast, from 1977 to 1979, industrial
relations and economic performance, ex-
cept for grievance rates, improved in the
five plants with high QWL program ratings
relative to performance in the five plants
with low QWL program ratings. The
plants with the highest QWL program
ratings on average had a 1.5 percent
improvement in their quality index,
whereas the plants with the lowest QWL
ratings had a .2 percent decrease in their
quality index. With respect to absentee
rates over the 1977-79 period, the plants
with the most QWL activity had a 1.8
percent increase, whereas the five with the
least activity had a 20.6 percent increase.
Within the top and bottom groups,
however, there was wide variation among
plants in changes in industrial relations and
economic performance. Thus, none of the
differences in the changes in performance
from 1977 to 1979 between the top and
bottom five plants are statistically signifi-
cant at even the .10 level.
Regression analysis. Another way to
measure the impact of QWL programs
with these data is to enter the QWL
program ratings as an independent vari-
able in regression analyses in which
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Table 4. Comparison of the Percent Change in Economic and
Industrial Relations Performance in the Five Plants with the Highest
and the Five with the Lowest 1977 QWL Program Rating.
+
Variable^
Product Quality
Direct-Labor Efficiency
Grievances
Absenteeism
Discipline
Percent Change, 1974-76
Five Plants with
Highest 1977
QWL Rating
4.2
5.5
17.6
47.5
42.1
Five Plants with
Lowest 1977
QWL Rating
6.1
4.7
4.3
23.4
18.8
Percent Change, 1977-79
Five Plants with
Highest 1977
QWL Rating
1.5
-2.4
5.2
1.8
6.0
Five Plants with
Lowest 1977
Q_WL Rating
-0.2
-4.8
4.8
20.6
11.5
All variables are as defined in Table 1.
economic performance indices are the
dependent variables and environmental
variables are included as control variables.
In some of these regressions, we also enter as
further controls grievance and absentee
rates and plant dummy variables. On the
other hand, concerned that these addi-
tional control variables might "overcontrol"
and strip the QWLprogram variable of its
true effects, we do not include the indus-
trial relations performance measures and
dummy variables as control variables in
some of the regressions.
Because of our inability to measure the
intensity of QWL programs prior to 1977,
we enter a score of zero for the QWL
program rating (QWLRATE) in each plant
for the years prior to 1977. Undoubtedly,
this introduces some measurement error,
but this procedure has the advantage of
allowing us to use other plant characteris-
tics (environmental and industrial rela-
tions) prior to 1977 as controls in the
estimation. Before reporting the results of
this analysis, we should also note that this
specification focuses on the impact that
QWL programs in place in any given year
exert on economic performance in that
year. This specification may, however, ig-
nore some of the dynamic effects of QWL
programs that appear over time.
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of these
regressions for pooled time-series and cross-
section plant-level data from the years
1970-79. In Table 5, the sign of the
coefficients on QWL rating implies that
more-intensive QWL programs are asso-
ciated with better product quality. In all
four regressions, the coefficient on QWL
rating is statistically significant at the one
percent level. Also, when the grievance and
absentee rates are not included as control
variables, the coefficient on QWL rating is
higher and has a higher t -statistic, suggest-
ing that some of the positive effect of the
QWL programs on quality is transmitted
through the infiuence of QWL efforts on
grievance and absentee rates. We interpret
these results as initial support for our
hypothesis that QWL efforts can improve
economic performance through their ef-
fects on industrial relations performance.
The sign of the coefficients on QWL
rating in Table 6, where direct-labor
efficiency is the dependent variable, im-
plies that more-intensive QWL programs
are associated with lower efficiency and
higher labor costs; however, none of these
coefficients is statistically significant at even
the 10 percent level. This finding is
inconsistent with the evidence provided in
Table 4, which shows that the five plants
with high QWL ratings in 1977 had relative
improvements in their direct-labor effi-
ciency from 1977 to 1979. Before discussing
a potential source of this inconsistency, we
will review a few other results from the
regressions.
Whenever the grievance rate is included
as a control variable in the regressions
reported in Tables 5 and 6, higher
grievance rates are associated with lower
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Table 5. Regression Analysis of the Effect of Environmental,
Industrial Relations, and QWL Rating Measures on Product Quality.
(standard errors in parentheses)
Explanatory Variables (if
Estimated Coefficients
(2)" (3f (4f
Intercept
Overtime
Total Hours
Grievances
Absenteeism
QWL Rating
R2
F
N
111.207**
(3.149)
.082
(.078)
-.132
(.334)
-.027**
(.009)
1.167**
(.330)
.183**
(.056)
.606
7.20
126
116.021**
(2.372)
.101
(.084)
-.122
(.318)
.281**
(.054)
.529
5.89
126
123.340**
(1.548)
.049
(.082)
-.184
(.178)
-.019**
(.005)
.320
(.260)
.240**
(.059)
.231
7.23
126
124.049**
(1.226)
.048
(.082)
-.272
(.181)
.267**
(.060)
.153
7.35
126
All variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3.
Plant dummy variables included as a set statistically significant at the .01 level in an F test.
Plant dummy variables not included.
**Statistically significant at tbe .01 level in a two-tailed test.
Table 6. Regression Analysis of the Effect of Environmental,
Industrial Relations, and QWL Program Rating Measures on Direct-Labor Efficiency."
(standard errors in parentheses)
Explanatory Variables (V"
Estimated Coefficients
(2)' (3f
Intercept
Overtime
Total Hours
Grievances
Absenteeism
QWL Rating
R2
F
N
126.305**
(5.387)
-.053
(.133)
-.099
(.533)
-.047**
(014)
.567
(.550)
-.153
(.105)
.549
8.19
171
127.272**
(3.829)
-.006
(.136)
-.619
(.496)
-.050
(.095)
.508
7.78
171
96.949**
(2.316)
-.114
(.130)
-.001
(.278)
-.050**
(.008)
-1.336**
(.410)
-.039
(.103)
.320
15.55
171
103.815*
(2.078)
-.349*
(.143)
-.347
(.312)
-.021
(.111)
.093
5.73
171
All variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3.
Plant dummy variables included as a set statistically significant at tbe .01 level in an F test.
Plant dummy variables not included.
*Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the .01 level in a two-tailed test.
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product quality and lower direct-labor
efficiency, and these associations are both
statistically significant at the one percent
level. This finding lends further support to
our hypothesis that the level of industrial
relations confiict affects economic per-
formance at the plant level.
The association between absentee rates
and quality and direct-labor efficiency in
the regression analysis is not consistent.
Higher absenteeism is associated with
better product quality, and in one of the
regressions, this association is statistically
significant at the one percent level. None-
theless, this may merely refiect the rise in
both quality and absenteeism in the late
1970s mentioned earlier. In one of the
regressions, higher direct-labor efficiency is
associated with lower absentee rates at a
statistically significant level of one percent,
although in another regression, this asso-
ciation is reversed and is not statistically
significant.
Whenever they are included in the
regressions, the plant dummy variables are
statistically significant as a set at the one
percent level.'" This result indicates that
there are a number of unmeasured plant
characteristics that also affect economic
performance.
Issues of selection bias. One difficulty in
assessing the validity of this estimation
procedure is whether the specification fully
adjusts for potential selection bias in this
sample of differentially distributed QWL
activities. For instance, the positive associa-
tion between QWL program rating and
lower direct-labor efficiency (Table 6)
could be the result of the fact that more-
extensive QWL programs were carried out
in plants that for some unmeasured reason
already had lower efficiency.
To analyze the issue of selection bias, we
measure tbe correlation between QWL
ratings in 1977 and measures of economic
and industrial relations performance in
1976. We also measure the correlation
between QWL ratings in 1979 and eco-
nomic and industrial relations perfor-
mance in 1978. These correlations, reported
in Table 7, show that in 1977, more-
extensive QWL programs tended to appear
in plants that in 1976 had shown good
economic and industrial relations perfor-
mance. For instance, the 1977 QWL rating
is negatively correlated with 1976 absentee
and grievance rates and positively asso-
ciated with labor efficiency. By 1979, this
pattern had largely reversed, as illustrated
by the fact that the 1979 QWL rating is
positively correlated with 1978 absentee
rates and negatively correlated with labor
efficiency. Note, however, that many of
these correlations are weak; only one
correlation is statistically significant at the
5 percent level, and some of the signs of the
correlations are inconsistent with the over-
all pattern.
Overall, the correlations reported in
Table 7 provide some evidence that in the
early stages of their introduction, QWL
programs were more extensive in GM's
better-performing plants. After observing
the success of the programs in those plants,
GM apparently decided to develop QWL
programis more extensively in plants that
had had histories of poor performance. A
number of implications follow from this
pattern. For one thing, the inconsistent
impact of QWL as measured in the
regression model may be the result of our
inability to account fully for selection bias
caused by the particular distribution of
QWL activity." Second, the way in which
QWL spread throughout these particular
plants offers some insight into how a
workplace innovation like QWL is diffused
in an organization. Furthermore, the exis-
tence of a diffusion pattern suggests that
future evaluations of QWL programs in
place at GM or elsewhere must take
account of selection bias or else misleading
findings may result.
"An F test is performed on the set of dummy
variables because F tests on individual plant dummy
variables will vary as a function of whichever plant is
used as the control group in the test.
"A possible methodology for future research is
estimation of a two-stage model that includes an
equation having the QWL program measure as the
dependent variable. At this time and with these data,
we are not confident of our ability to predict QWL
development with this kind of linear model.
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Table 7. Correlation of QWL Rating and Economic and Industrial
Relations Performance.^
Product
Quality
-.120
(.636)
-.024
(.924)
Direct-Labor
Efficiency
1976
.484
(.042)
1978
-.167
(.510)
Grievances
- .463
(.053)
-.195
(.439)
A bsenteeism
- .363
(.139)
.169
(.502)
Discipli
.086
(.733)
-.185
. (.463)
QWL Rating
Rating in 1977
Rating in 1979
The numbers in parentheses are statistical-significance levels of each correlation. There are 18 observations in
each year. All variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 3.
Discussion
The results of this study provide initial
support for the proposition that measures
of industrial relations performance, such as
grievance and discipline rates, union-
management climate, absenteeism, and
difficulty in contract negotiations, are
systematically interrelated and also strongly
related to measures of economic perform-
ance, such as direct-labor efficiency and
product quality.
Less conclusive are the results of our tests
of the proposition that QWL efforts have
produced improvements in industrial rela-
tions and economic performance across the
eighteen plants studied. There is some
evidence in Table 4 of greater marginal
improvements in economic and industrial
relations performance in plants that devel-
oped a high level of QWL activity than in
those with a low level of QWL activity. In
Table 5, regression analysis shows an
association between more-extensive plant-
level QWL activity and better product
quality. There is also evidence that some of
the impact of QWL activity on product
quality is transmitted through its effect on
industrial relations performance (that is,
on grievance and absentee rates). In Table
6, however, regression analysis does not
reveal a positive association between more-
extensive QWL activity and higher direct-
labor efficiency.
Our evaluation of these QWL efforts is
frustrated by the complicated diffusion
pattern of QWL activities shown in Table 7.
The evaluation is also limited by the short
time period in which the effects of the
programs could be observed and by the
weaknesses in our measure of the intensity
of QWL efforts. We will return to a
discussion of the implications of these
limitations for future research after discuss-
ing the theoretical meaning of the strong
relationships observed between industrial
relations and economic performance in
these plants.
Toward a theoretical rationale. Practi-
tioners who promote QWL principles and
who would like to reduce the adversarial
elements of the U.S. industrial relations
system may find it rather "academic" to ask
whether a clear theoretical rationale exists
to support these strategies. Yet, if this
experimental atmosphere is to be trans-
lated into lasting improvements in the
conduct of industrial relations at the plant
level, we must have a better understanding
of why and how industrial relations per-
formance affects organizational effective-
ness and how QWL or similar innovations
might improve these outcomes. The em-
pirical results reported in this exploratory
study further underscore the importance of
finding a better theoretical explanation of
current initiatives.
Both results and the current increase in
QWL activities in enterprises suggest that
an avenue by which productivity in union-
ized settings can be improved is through
more effective management of conflict and
greater collaboration at the workplace.
What explains these results and this growth
in activity? Clearly, more is involved than
the simple and empirically unsubstantiated
proposition of the human relations move-
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ment that greater productivity will result
from increasing individual workers' satis-
faction and group cooperation." We be-
lieve that a more complete understanding
lies in a closer examination of the conse-
quences of various means of manag;ing
conflict at the workplace.
Fox has argued that the central problem
of industrial relations is overcoming the
high-conflict and low-trust dynamic that
can be set in motion within a bargaining
relationship." Indeed, we see the reinforc-
ing cycle of correlations shown in Table 2 as
illustrative of Fox's argument. A high level
of formal grievance and discipline cases, a
poor attitudinal climate between the union
and management, high levels of absentee-
ism, and difficult contract negotiations
indicate ineffective conflict management
at the plant level and symbolize the
carryover of the high-conflict and low-trust
dynamic from one part of the employment
relationship to another. This cycle ulti-
mately affects economic performance. The
diversity of industrial relations and
economic performance throughout GM is
testimony to the fact that there is wide
variation in the extent to which labor
relations practice in these plants is caught
up in this cycle.
QWL efforts, then, can be seen as one
strategy for atteniipting to break out of the
cycle of high conflict and low trust. Such
change might lead to improved economic
performance in at least three ways. First,
there may be a displacement effect, as
fewer resources and emotional energies
have to be allocated either to processing or
resolving conflicts through the formal
adversarial procedures or to creating
stronger and more complex rules and
control procedures to manage the work
force. The function of the personnel and
industrial relations departments can thus
shift in emphasis from processing
grievances and administering the adver-
sarial aspects of the employment relation-
ship to an emphasis on training supervisors
in effective communication and problem
solving.
A second result of moving away from the
adversarial cycle may be the enhanced
motivation of individual workers. To the
extent that workers are interested in more
participation in job-related decision mak-
ing, they may respond to these strategies by
sharing their ideas on how to improve work
performance, increasing their commit-
ment to the job and the firm, and
performing more effectively. We might call
this the communication-motivation-
commitment cycle.^ "
Finally, these efforts may provide some
direct payoffs to the firm in the form of
greater flexibility in human resource
management. There may be, that is, fewer
rules regarding who does what tasks, more
training in how to do a wider variety of
tasks, and fewer constraints on how the
work is organized.
Modifications in the high-conflict and
low-trust cycle may offer some of these
positive returns to employers and employ-
ees, but we do not expect that QWL efforts
will produce an end to the adversarial
relationship between labor and manage-
ment, as many of the more ardent support-
ers of the QWL programs suggest. Indeed,
those who expect either an end to conflict at
the workplace or a solution to the nation's
productivity problems as the result of QWL
efforts fall into the same trap as many
members of the human relations school did
years ago, when they igpiored the larger
economic and structural contexts of the
employment relationship. Clearly, the par-
ties in the auto industry, and in other
industries as well, continue to face major
differences in economic interests —
differences that require negotiation, com-
"See Donald P. Schwab and Larry L. Cummings,
"Theories of Satisfaction and Performance: A Review,"
Industrial Relations, Vol. 9, No. 4 (October 1970), pp.
408-30.
"Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and
Trust Relations (London: Faber, 1974), pp. 248-313.
°^For two different theoretical models that are
consistent with this argument, see J. Richard Hackman
and Greg R. Oldham, "Motivation Through the Design
of Work: Test of a Theory," Organizational Behax/ior
and Human Performance, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August
1976), pp. 250 - 74; and Richard E. Walton, "Establish-
ing and Maintaining High Commitment Work Sys-
tems," in John R. Kimberly and Robert A. Miles, eds.,
The Organizational Life Cycle: Issues in the Creation,
Transformation and Decline of Organizations (San
Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1980), pp. 208-90.
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promise, and periodic adjustment. The
tension between shop-floor cooperation
and adversarial bargaining will be greatest
when contract negotiators confront diffi-
cult problems. Thus, the key to the success
of these QWL efforts will lie in whether
they are able to maintain effective collab-
oration at the workplace level over an
extended period of time and, especially,
during periods when difficult problems are
being resolved within the bargaining rela-
tionship.
Implications for research. Future re-
searchers investigating the role and impact
of QWL or other worker-participation
programs in unionized settings can draw
the following inferences from this study.
One task of future research should be to
develop better measures of QWL activities.
It is also clear that we need to trace the
effects of these programs over a longer
period of time to test the staying power of
cooperative efforts in the midst of mixed-
motive bargaining.^' The role that union
participation plays in QWL programs also
remains unexamined. Although local
union support for the QWL programs in
our sample varied substantially, no direct
measure of union support was available.
Future researchers should test the hypothe-
sis that QWL efforts have different degrees
of success or longevity depending on
whether unions are joint partners in the
program or management initiates all ac-
tivities and the local union adapts a neutral
or an antagonistic role. We also need
further theoretical elaboration of the chan-
nels through which industrial relations
performance and QWL efforts affect eco-
nomic performance.
Finally, most previous research (and to
some extent, the research reported here as
well) fails to relate QWL and other
cooperative efforts at the workplace to the
broader strategies and events that affect
relations between a union and an em-
ployer. ^^ Only by examining how these
innovations fit into the larger industrial
relations system in which they are
embedded will we be able to determine
whether they are simply another in a long
list of short-lived fads at the workplace or in
fact represent the beginnings of a new
industrial relations system.
'^For a theoretical discussion of the employment
relationship as a mixed-motive situation, see Walton
and McKersie, A Behavioral Theory, pp. 161 -83.
^Tor a discussion of some of these broader issues, see
Harry C. Katz, "Assessing the New Auto Labor
Agreements," Sloan Management Review, Vol. 23, No.
4 (Summer 1982), pp. 57-63; and Harry C. Katz, "The
U.S. Automobile Collective Bargaining System in
Transition," British foumal of Industrial Relations
(forthcoming).
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Appendix
The QWL Ck>ntent Analysis
The QWL content analysis was performed in the
following manner. Cards that listed the representative
QWL activities below were provided to five industrial
relations professors and graduate students with exper-
tise in QWL programs, who were asked to rank these
activities in three categories according to the signifi-
cance they attached to the activity. The three categories
then were assigned the following weights: minor
significance, one point; intermediate significance, two
points; and major significance, three points. An
average weight was derived for each activity based on
the rankings provided by the five experts. Another
expert then recorded the occurrence of these activities
in each plant, by using plant managers' annual reports
that describe the QWL activities within each plant.
Each activity was assigned its weight, and a total QWL
score was computed for each plant for each year (1977 -
80). In a test of the reliability of this scoring procedure,
a second expert also reviewed the annual reports and
assigned the appropriate weight. The correlation
between the scores obtained by the two experts was .85.
List of Representative QWL Activities
1. Open house and plant tours for employee families
or community residents, or both.
2. Community relations projects such as blood drives
or United Way campaigns.
3. Physical-plant improvements, such as painting
the walls or housekeeping improvements.
4. Off-site training or problem-discussion meetings
with salaried staff.
5. Off-site training or problem-discussion meetings
with hourly workers.
6. Off-site meetings between plant management and
union representatives.
7. Alcohol- or drug-abuse programs.
8. Experimental projects that involve specific work
groups in the plant.
9. Promotional programs that advertise the plant,
such as plant Tshirts, jackets, or pens.
10. Consultation meetings with hourly workers or
union representatives over future QWL initiatives.
11. Formation (or continuation) of a union-
management QWL or other committee.
12. Use of an outside consultant (or a GM or UAW
QWL specialist).
13. Special programs emphasizing product quality,
offering such rewards as prizes, cash, or recognition.
14. Motivational films or other media presentations
to the work force.
15. Feedback of QWL survey to workers or union
representatives, or both.
16. Joint GM-UAW orientation programs for new
hires.
17. Management's sharing information on plans for
plant expansion, renovation, or other changes with
workers or union representatives, or both.
18. Upward communications programs, such as
question boxes, suggestion boxes, or plant newsletters.
19. Special dinners or luncheons for, for example,
retiring employees, Christmas, or other occasions.
20. Enhancing the role of the first-line supervisors,
such as through special seminars.

